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Abstract. In the present paper, we propose Abstract Algebraic Logic
(AAL) as a general logical framework for Judgment Aggregation. Our
main contribution is a generalization of Herzberg’s algebraic approach
to characterization results in on judgment aggregation and propositional-
attitude aggregation, characterizing certain Arrovian classes of aggrega-
tors as Boolean algebra and MV-algebra homomorphisms, respectively.
The characterization result of the present paper applies to agendas of
formulas of an arbitrary selfextensional logic. This notion comes from
AAL, and encompasses a vast class of logics, of which classical, intu-
itionistic, modal, many-valued and relevance logics are special cases. To
each selfextensional logic S , a unique class of algebras AlgS is canon-
ically associated by the general theory of AAL. We show that for any
selfextensional logic S such that AlgS is closed under direct products, any
algebra in AlgS can be taken as the set of truth values on which an aggre-
gation problem can be formulated. In this way, judgment aggregation on
agendas formalized in classical, intuitionistic, modal, many-valued and
relevance logic can be uniformly captured as special cases. This paves
the way to the systematic study of a wide array of “realistic agendas”
made up of complex formulas, the propositional connectives of which are
interpreted in ways which depart from their classical interpretation. This
is particularly interesting given that, as observed by Dietrich [4], non-
classical (subjunctive) interpretation of logical connectives can provide
a strategy for escaping impossibility results.
Keywords: Judgment aggregation; Systematicity; Impossibility theorems;
Abstract Algebraic Logic; Logical filter; Algebra homomorphism.
Math. Subject Class. 91B14; 03G27.
1 Introduction
Social choice and judgment aggregation. The theory of social choice is
the formal study of mechanisms for collective decision making, and investigates
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2issues of philosophical, economic, and political significance, stemming from the
classical Arrovian problem of how the preferences of the members of a group can
be “fairly” aggregated into one outcome.
In the last decades, many results appeared generalizing the original Arrovian
problem, which gave rise to a research area called judgment aggregation (JA) [21].
While the original work of Arrow [1] focuses on preference aggregation, this can
be recognized as a special instance of the aggregation of consistent judgments,
expressed by each member of a group of individuals over a given set of logically
interconnected propositions (the agenda): each proposition in the agenda is either
accepted or rejected by each group member, so as to satisfy certain requirements
of logical consistency. Within the JA framework, the Arrovian-type impossibility
results (axiomatically providing sufficient conditions for aggregator functions to
turn into degenerate rules, such as dictatorship) are obtained as consequences of
characterization theorems [22], which provide necessary and sufficient conditions
for agendas to have aggregator functions on them satisfying given axiomatic
conditions.
In the same logical vein, in [20], attitude aggregation theory was introduced; this
direction has been further pursued in [15], where a characterization theorem has
been given for certain many-valued propositional-attitude aggregators as MV-
algebra homomorphisms.
The ultrafilter argument and its generalizations. Methodologically, the
ultrafilter argument is the tool underlying the generalizations and unifications
mentioned above. It can be sketched as follows: to prove impossibility theorems
for finite electorates, one shows that the axiomatic conditions on the aggre-
gation function force the set of all decisive coalitions to be an (ultra)filter on
the powerset of the electorate. If the electorate is finite, this implies that all
the decisive coalitions must contain one and the same (singleton) coalition: the
oligarchs (the dictator). First employed in [19] for a proof of Arrow’s theorem
alternative to the original one, this argument was applied to obtain elegant and
concise proofs of impossibility theorems also in judgment aggregation [5]. More
recently, it gave rise to characterization theorems, e.g. establishing a bijective
correspondence between Arrovian aggregation rules and ultrafilters on the set
of individuals [16]. Moreover, the ultrafilter argument has been generalized by
Herzberg [13] to obtain a bijective correspondence between certain judgment
aggregation functions and ultraproducts of profiles, and—using the well-known
correspondence between ultrafilters and Boolean homomorphisms—similar cor-
respondences have been established between Arrovian judgment aggregators and
Boolean algebra homomorphisms [14].
Escaping impossibility via nonclassical logics. While much research in
this area explored the limits of the applicability of Arrow-type results, at the
same time the question of how to ‘escape impossibility’ started attracting in-
creasing interest. In [4], Dietrich shows that impossibility results do not apply
to a wide class of realistic agendas once propositions of the form ‘if a then b’ are
modelled as subjunctive implications rather than material implications. Besides
3its theoretical value, this result is of practical interest, given that subjunctive
implication models the meaning of if-then statements in natural language more
accurately than material implication.
Aim. A natural question arising in the light of Dietrich’s result is how to high-
light the role played by the logic (understood both as formal language and de-
ductive machinery) underlying the given agenda in characterization theorems
for JA.
The present paper focuses on Abstract Algebraic Logic as a natural theoretical
setting for Herzberg’s results [13, 15], and the theory of (fully) selfextensional
logics as the appropriate logical framework for a nonclassical interpretation of
logical connectives, in line with the approach of [4].
Abstract Algebraic Logic and selfextensional logics. Abstract Algebraic
Logic (AAL) [9] is a forty-year old research field in mathematical logic. It was
conceived as the framework for an algebraic approach to the investigation of
classes of logics. Its main goal was establishing a notion of canonical algebraic
semantics uniformly holding for classes of logics, and using it to systematically
investigate (metalogical) properties of logics in connection with properties of
their algebraic counterparts.
Selfextensionality is the metalogical property holding of those logical systems
whose associated relation of logical equivalence on formulas is a congruence of
the term algebra. Wo´jcicki [23] characterized selfextensional logics as the logics
which admit a so-called referential semantics (which is a general version of the
well known possible-world semantics of modal and intuitionistic logics), and
in [18], a characterization was given of the particularly well behaved subclass of
the fully selfextensional logics in general duality-theoretic terms. This subclass
includes many well-known logics, such as classical, intuitionistic, modal, many-
valued and relevance logic. These and other results in this line of research (cf. e.g.
[6,7,12,17]) establish a systematic connection between possible world semantics
and the logical account of intensionality.
Contributions. In the present paper, we generalize and refine Herzberg’s char-
acterization result in [15] from the MV-algebra setting to any class of algebras
canonically associated with some selfextensional logic.
In particular, the properties of agendas are formulated independently of a specific
logical signature and are slightly different than those of Herzberg’s setting. In
contrast with Herzberg’s characterization result, which consisted of two slightly
asymmetric parts, the two propositions which yield the characterization result
in the present paper (cf. Propositions 1 and 2) are symmetric. Aggregation of
propositional attitudes modeled in classical, intuitionistic, modal,  Lukasiewicz
and relevance logic can be uniformly captured as special cases of the present
result. This makes it possible to fine-tune the expressive and deductive power
of the formal language of the agenda, so as to capture e.g. intensional or vague
statements.
4Structure of the paper In Section 2 we give preliminaries on Abstract Alge-
braic Logic. In Section 3 we provide the formal framework for judgment aggre-
gation. In Section 4 we prove the correspondence result. In Section 5 we state
the impossibility theorem for judgment aggregation as a corollary, and discuss
the setting of subjunctive implication.
2 Preliminaries on Abstract Algebraic Logic
The present section collects the basic concepts of Abstract Algebraic Logic that
we will use in the paper. For a general view of AAL the reader is addressed to [8]
and the references therein.
2.1 General approach.
As mentioned in the introduction, in AAL, logics are not studied in isolation,
and in particular, investigation focuses on classes of logics and their identify-
ing metalogical properties. Moreover, the notion of consequence rather than the
notion of theoremhood is taken as basic: consequently, sentential logics, the prim-
itive objects studied in AAL, are defined as tuples S = 〈Fm,⊢S〉 where Fm is
the algebra of formulas of type LS over a denumerable set of variables V ar, and
⊢S is a consequence relation on (the carrier of) Fm (cf. Subsection 2.3).
This notion encompasses logics that are defined by any sort of proof-theoretic
calculus (Gentzen-style, Hilbert-style, tableaux, etc.), as well as logics arising
from some classes of (set-theoretic, order-theoretic, topological, algebraic, etc.)
semantic structures, and in fact it allows to treat logics independently of the way
in which they have been originally introduced. Another perhaps more common
approach in logic takes the notion of theoremhood as basic and consequently
sees logics as sets of formulas (possibly closed under some rules of inference).
This approach is easily recaptured by the notion of sentential logic adopted in
AAL: Every sentential logic S is uniquely associated with the set Thm(S) =
{ϕ ∈ Fm | ∅ ⊢S ϕ} of its theorems.
2.2 Consequence operations
For any set A, a consequence operation (or closure operator) on A is a map
C : P(A) → P(A) such that for every X,Y ⊆ A: (1) X ⊆ C(X), (2) if X ⊆
Y , then C(X) ⊆ C(Y ) and (3) C(C(X)) = C(X). The closure operator C is
finitary if in addition satisfies (4) C(X) =
⋃
{C(Z) : Z ⊆ X,Z finite}. For any
consequence operation C on A, a set X ⊆ A is C-closed if C(X) = X . Let CC
be the collection of C-closed subsets of A.
For any set A, a closure system on A is a collection C ⊆ P(A) such that A ∈ C,
and C is closed under intersections of arbitrary non-empty families. A closure
system is algebraic if it is closed under unions of up-directed3 families.
3 For 〈P,≤〉 a poset, U ⊆ P is up-directed when for any a, b ∈ U there exists c ∈ U
such that a, b ≤ c.
5For any closure operator C on A, the collection CC of the C-closed subsets of A
is a closure system on A. If C is finitary, then CC is algebraic. Any closure system
C on A defines a consequence operation CC on A by setting CC(X) =
⋂
{Y ∈
C : X ⊆ Y } for every X ⊆ A. The CC-closed sets are exactly the elements of C.
Moreover, C is algebraic if and only if CC is finitary.
2.3 Logics
Let L be a propositional language (i.e. a set of connectives, which we will also
regard as a set of function symbols) and let FmL denote the algebra of formulas
(or term algebra) of L over a denumerable set V of variables. Let FmL be
the carrier of the algebra FmL. A logic (or deductive system) of type L is a
pair S = 〈FmL,⊢S〉 such that ⊢S⊆ P(FmL) × FmL such that the operator
C⊢S : P(FmL)→ P(FmL) defined by
ϕ ∈ C⊢S (Γ ) iff Γ ⊢S ϕ
is a consequence operation with the property of invariance under substitutions ;
this means that for every substitution σ (i.e. for every L-homomorphism σ :
FmL → FmL) and for every Γ ⊆ FmL,
σ[C⊢S (Γ )] ⊆ C⊢S (σ[Γ ]).
For every S, the relation ⊢S is the consequence or entailment relation of S. A
logic is finitary if the consequence operation C⊢S is finitary. Sometimes we will
use the symbol LS to refer to the propositional language of a logic S.
The interderivability relation of a logic S is the relation ≡S defined by
ϕ ≡S ψ iff ϕ ⊢S ψ and ψ ⊢S ϕ.
S satisfies the congruence property if ≡S is a congruence of FmL.
2.4 Logical filters
Let S be a logic of type L and let A be an L-algebra (from now on, we will drop
reference to the type L, and when we refer to an algebra or class of algebras in
relation with S, we will always assume that the algebra and the algebras in the
class are of type L).
A subset F ⊆ A is an S-filter of A if for every Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm and every
h ∈ Hom(FmL,A),
if Γ ⊢S ϕ and h[Γ ] ⊆ F, then h(ϕ) ∈ F.
The collection FiS(A) of the S-filters ofA is a closure system. Moreover, FiS(A)
is an algebraic closure system if S is finitary. The consequence operation associ-
ated with FiS(A) is denoted by C
A
S
. For every X ⊆ A, the closed set CA
S
(X) is
the S-filter of A generated by X . If S is finitary, then CA
S
is finitary for every
algebra A.
On the algebra of formulas Fm, the closure operator CFm
S
coincides with C⊢S
and the CFm
S
-closed sets are exactly the S-theories ; that is, the sets of formulas
which are closed under the relation ⊢S .
62.5 S-algebras and selfextensional logics
One of the basic topics of AAL is how to associate in a uniform way a class of
algebras with an arbitrary logic S. According to contemporary AAL [11], the
canonical algebraic counterpart of S is the class AlgS, whose elements are called
S-algebras. This class can be defined via the notion of Tarski congruence.
For any algebra A (of the same type as S) and any closure system C on A,
the Tarski congruence of C relative to A, denoted by Ω˜A(C), is the greatest
congruence which is compatible with all F ∈ C, that is, which does not relate
elements of F with elements which do not belong to F . The Tarski congruence
of the closure system consisting of all S-theories relative to Fm is denoted by
Ω˜(S). The quotient algebra Fm/Ω˜(S) is called the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra
of S.
For any algebra A, we say that A is an S-algebra (cf. [11, Definition 2.16]) if
the Tarski congruence of FiS(A) relative to A is the identity. It is well-known
(cf. [11, Theorem 2.23] and ensuing discussion) that AlgS is closed under direct
products. Moreover, for any logic S, the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra is an S-
algebra (see page 36 in [11]).
A logic S is selfextensional when the relation of logical equivalence between
formulas
ϕ ≡S ψ iff ϕ ⊢S ψ and ψ ⊢S ϕ
is a congruence relation of the formula algebra Fm. An equivalent definition of
selfextensionality (see page 48 in [11]) is given as follows: S is selfextensional
iff the Tarski congruence Ω˜(S) and the relation of logical equivalence ≡S coin-
cide. In such case the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra reduces to Fm/ ≡S . Exam-
ples of selfextensional logics besides classical propositional logic are intuitionis-
tic logic, positive modal logic [3], the {∧,∨}-fragment of classical propositional
logic, Belnap’s four-valued logic [2] the local consequence relation associated
with Kripke frames, and the (order-induced) consequence relation associated
with MV-algebras and defined by “preserving degrees of truth” (cf. [10]). Exam-
ples of non-selfextensional logics include linear logic, the (1-induced) consequence
relation associated with MV-algebras and defined by “preserving absolute truth”
(cf. [10]), and the global consequence relation associated with Kripke frames.
From now on we assume that S is a selfextensional logic and B ∈ AlgS. For any
formula ϕ ∈ Fm, we say that ϕ is provably equivalent to a variable iff there exist
a variable x such that ϕ ≡ x.
3 Formal framework
In the present section, we generalize Herzberg’s algebraic framework for ag-
gregation theory from MV-propositional attitudes to S-propositional attitudes,
where S is an arbitrary selfextensional logic. Our conventional notation is similar
to [15]. Let L be a logical language which contains countably many connectives,
each of which has arity at most n, and let Fm be the collection of L-formulas.
73.1 The agenda
The agenda will be given by a set of formulasX ⊆ Fm. Let X¯ denote the closure
of X under the connectives of the language. Notice that for any constant c ∈ L,
we have c ∈ X¯.
We want the agenda to contain a sufficiently rich collection of formulas. In the
classical case, it is customary to assume that the agenda contains at least two
propositional variables. In our general framework, this translates in the require-
ment that the agenda contains at least n formulas that ‘behave’ like proposi-
tional variables, in the sense that their interpretation is not constrained by the
interpretation of any other formula in the agenda.
We could just assume that the agenda contains at least n different propositional
variables, but we will deal with a slightly more general situation, namely, we
assume that the agenda is n-pseudo-rich:
Definition 1. An agenda is n-pseudo-rich, if it contains at least n formulas
{δ1, . . . , δn} such that each δi is provably equivalent to xi for some set {x1, . . . , xn}
of pairwise different variables.
3.2 Attitude functions, profiles and attitude aggregators
An attitude function is a function A ∈ BX which assigns each formula in the
agenda to an element of the algebra B.
The electorate will be given by some (finite or infinite) set N . Each i ∈ N is
called an individual.
An attitude profile is an N -sequence of attitude functions, i.e. A ∈ (BX)N . For
each ϕ ∈ X , we denote the N -sequence {Ai(ϕ)}i∈N ∈ BN by A(ϕ).
An attitude aggregator is a function which maps each profile of individual atti-
tude functions in some domain to a collective attitude function, interpreted as
the set of preferences of the electorate as a whole. Formally, an attitude aggre-
gator is a partial map F : (BX)N 9 BX .
3.3 Rationality
Let the agenda contain formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕm, g(ϕ1, . . . , ϕm) ∈ X , where g ∈ L is
an m-ary connective of the language and m ≤ n. Among all attitude functions
A ∈ BX , those for which it holds that A(g(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)) = gB(A(ϕ1), . . . , A(ϕn))
are of special interest. In general, we will focus on attitude functions which are
‘consistent’ with the logic S in the following sense.
We say that an attitude function A ∈ BX is rational if it can be extended to a
homomorphism A¯ : Fm/≡ −→ B of S-algebras. In particular, if A is rational,
then it can be uniquely extended to X¯, and we will implicitly use this fact in
what follows.
We say that a profile A ∈ (BX)N is rational if Ai is a rational attitude function
for each i ∈ N .
We say that an attitude aggregator F : (BX)N 9 BX is rational if for all
rational profilesA ∈ dom(F ) in its domain, F (A) is a rational attitude function.
8Moreover, we say that F is universal ifA ∈ dom(F ) for any rational profileA. In
other words, an aggregator is universal whenever its domain contains all rational
profiles, and it is rational whenever it gives a rational output provided a rational
input.
3.4 Decision criteria and systematicity
A decision criterion for F is a partial map f : BN 9 B such that for all
A ∈ dom(F ) and all ϕ ∈ X ,
F (A)(ϕ) = f(A(ϕ)). (3.1)
As observed by Herzberg [15], an aggregator is independent if the aggregate
attitude towards any proposition ϕ does not depend on the individuals attitudes
towards propositions other than ϕ:
An aggregator F is independent if there exists some map g : BN ×X 9 B such
that for all A ∈ dom(F ), the following diagram commutes (whenever the partial
maps are defined):
X BN ×X
A, idX
//
B
F (A) ((PP
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
g

An aggregator F is systematic if there exists some decision criterion f for F , i.e.
there exists some map f : BN 9 B such that for all A ∈ dom(F ), the following
diagram commutes (whenever the partial maps are defined):
X BN
A
//
B
F (A) !!❈
❈
❈
❈
❈
❈
❈
❈
f

Systematic aggregation is a special case of independent aggregation, in which
the output of g does not depend on the input in the second coordinate. Thus, g
is reduced to a decision criterion f : BN 9 B.
An aggregator F is strongly systematic if there exists some decision criterion f
for F , such that for all A ∈ dom(F ), the following diagram commutes (whenever
the partial maps are defined):
X¯ BN
A
//
B
F (A) !!❈
❈
❈
❈
❈
❈
❈
❈
f

9Notice that the diagram above differs from the previous one in that the agenda
X is now replaced by its closure X¯ under the connectives of the language. If X is
closed under the operations in LS , then systematicity and strong systematicity
coincide.
A formula ϕ ∈ Fm is strictly contingent if for all a ∈ B there exists some ho-
momorphism v : Fm → B such that v(ϕ) = a. Notice that for any n ≥ 1, any
n-pseudo rich agenda (cf. Definition 1) always contains a strictly contingent for-
mula. Moreover, if the agenda contains some strictly contingent formula ϕ, then
any universal systematic attitude aggregator F has a unique decision criterion
(cf. [15, Remark 3.5]).
Before moving on to the main section, we mention four definitions which appear
in Herzberg’s paper, namely that of Paretian attitude aggregator (cf. [15, Def-
inition 3.7]), complex and rich agendas (cf. [15, Definition 3.8]), and strongly
systematizable aggregators (cf. [15, Definition 3.9]). Unlike the previous ones,
these definitions rely on the specific MV-signature, and thus do not have a nat-
ural counterpart in the present, vastly more general setting. However, as we will
see, our main result can be formulated independently of these definitions. More-
over, a generalization of the Pareto condition follows from the assumptions of F
being universal, rational and strongly systematic, as then it holds that for any
constant c ∈ LS , and any ϕ ∈ Fm, if Ai(ϕ) = c for all i ∈ N , then F (A)(ϕ) = c.
4 Results
Lemma 1. Let X be an n-pseudo-rich agenda, m ≤ n, g ∈ L be an m-ary
connective and a1, . . . , am ∈ B. Then there exist formulas δ1, . . . , δm ∈ X in the
agenda and a rational attitude function A : X −→ B such that A(δj) = aj for
each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Proof. As the agenda is n-pseudo-rich, there are formulas δ1, . . . , δm ∈ X each
of which is provably equivalent to a different variable xi. Notice that this implies
that the formulas δ1, . . . , δm are not pairwise interderivable. So the ≡-equivalence
cells [δ1], . . . , [δm] are pairwise different, and moreover there exists a valuation
v : Fm/≡ −→ B such that v(δi) = ai for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Let A := v ◦ pi↾X ,
where pi↾X : X → Fm/≡ is the restriction of the canonical projection pi : Fm→
Fm/≡ to X . Then clearly A : X → B is the required rational attitude function.
Lemma 2. Let X be an n-pseudo-rich agenda, m ≤ n, g ∈ L be an m-ary
connective and a1, . . . ,am ∈ BN . Then there exist formulas δ1, . . . , δm ∈ X in
the agenda and a rational attitude profile A : X −→ BN such that A(δj) = aj
for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Proof. As the agenda is n-pseudo-rich, there are formulas δ1, . . . , δm ∈ X each
of which is provably equivalent to a different variable xi. By previous lemma,
for each i ∈ N , there exists a rational attitude function Ai : X −→ B such
that Ai(δj) = aj(i) for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Thus it is easy to check that the
sequence of attitudes A := {Ai}i∈N is a rational profile such that A(δj) = aj for
each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
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Recall that given that X is n-pseudo rich, there exists a unique decision criterion
for any strongly systematic attitude aggregator F (cf. page 9).
Proposition 1. Let F be a rational, universal and strongly systematic attitude
aggregator. Then the decision criterion of F is a homomorphism of S-algebras.
Proof. By the strong systematicity of F , there exists a decision criterion f :
BN −→ B of F . Let us show that under the assumptions of the proposition, f is
a homomorphism of S-algebras, by showing that f(cB
N
) = cB for each constant
c ∈ L, and that, for each m-ary connective g ∈ L, and any a1, . . . ,am ∈ BN ,
f(gB
N
(a1, . . . ,am)) = g
B(f(a1), . . . , f(am)).
Let c ∈ L be a constant and let A be a rational profile. By definition c ∈ X¯.
Since A is rational, it can be extended to X¯ so that A(c) = cB
N
. Moreover,
as F (A) is also rational, it can also be extended to X¯ so that F (A)(c) = cB.
Therefore, by F being strongly systematic, we get:
f(cB
N
) = f(A(c)) = F (A)(c) = cB.
Let g ∈ L be an m-ary connective, where recall that m ≤ n and let a1, . . . ,am ∈
BN . By Lemma 2 and the n-pseudo-richness of the agenda, there are formulas
δ1, . . . , δm ∈ X and a rational profile A : X −→ B such that
A(δj) = aj for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (4.1)
Notice that for each i ∈ N , Ai being rational implies that it can be extended to
X¯ so that Ai(g(δ1, . . . , δm)) = g
B(Ai(δ1), . . . , Ai(δm)) = g
B(a1(i), . . . ,am(i)).
Therefore, by the definition of operation the g in the product algebraBN ∈ AlgS
we have
A(g(δ1, . . . , δm)) = g
B
N
(a1, . . . ,am). (4.2)
By the assumption of F being universal, it follows that A ∈ dom(F ). Moreover,
since F is rational, F (A) is a rational attitude function, hence it can be extended
to X¯ so that
F (A)(g(δ1, . . . , δm)) = g
B(F (A)(δ1), . . . , F (A)(δm)). (4.3)
Finally, since F is strongly systematic,
F (A)(δj) = f(A(δj)) for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, and (4.4)
F (A)(g(δ1, . . . , δm)) = f(A(g(δ1, . . . , δm))). (4.5)
Hence,
f(gB
N
(a1, . . . ,am)) = f(A(g(δ1, . . . , δm))) (4.2)
= F (A)(g(δ1, . . . , δm)) (4.5)
= gB(F (A)(δ1), . . . , F (A)(δm)) (4.3)
= gB(f(A(δ1)), . . . , f(A(δm))) (4.4)
= gB(f(a1), . . . , f(am))), (4.1)
11
as required.
Proposition 2. Let f : BN 9 B be a homomorphism of S-algebras. Then the
function F : (BX)N 9 BX , defined for any rational profile A and any ϕ ∈ X
by the following assignment:
F (A)(ϕ) = f(A(ϕ)),
is a rational, universal and strongly systematic attitude aggregator.
Proof. By definition F is a universal aggregator, and moreover its domain coin-
cides with the set of all rational profiles.
Let A be a rational profile. Then it can be extended to a homomorphism v :
Fm/ ≡ −→ BN . Hence, f ◦ v is also a homomorphism. Let us show that the
restriction of f ◦ v to the agenda X coincides with F (A). Indeed, for any ϕ ∈ X
we have
f(v(ϕ)) = f(A(ϕ)) = F (A)(ϕ),
as required. This shows that F (A) is a rational attitude function, and hence F
is a rational attitude aggregator.
It immediately follows from the definition that F is systematic. LetA ∈ dom(F ).
By definition A is rational, so it can be uniquely extended to X¯. Therefore, by a
similar argument as in previous paragraph, we can uniquely extend F (A) to X¯
so that for any ϕ ∈ X¯, F (A)(ϕ) = f(A(ϕ)). This shows that F is also strongly
systematic, which finishes the proof.
Finally, the conclusion of the following corollary expresses a property which is a
generalization of the Pareto condition (cf. [15, Definition 3.7]).
Corollary 1. If F is universal, rational and strongly systematic, then for any
constant c ∈ LS and any ϕ ∈ Fm, if Ai(ϕ) = cB for all i ∈ N , then F (A)(ϕ) =
cB.
Proof. Let c ∈ LS and ϕ ∈ Fm. Notice that by definition of the product algebra,
the sequence {cB}i∈N is precisely cB
N
. If Ai(ϕ) = c
B for all i ∈ N , i.e. A(ϕ) =
cB
N
, then by Proposition 1, F (A)(ϕ) = f(A(ϕ)) = f(cB
N
) = cB, as required.
5 Applications
In the present section, we show how the setting in the present paper relates to
existing settings in the literature.
5.1 Arrow-type impossibility theorem for judgment aggregation
Let S be the classical propositional logic. Its algebraic counterpart AlgS = BA is
the variety of Boolean algebras. Let L = {¬,∨} be its language (the connectives
∧,→,↔ are definable from the primitive ones). Let B = 2 be the two-element
Boolean algebra. Let X ⊆ FmL be a 2-pseudo-rich agenda.
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By Propositions 1 and 2, for every electorate N , there exists a bijection between
rational, universal and strongly systematic attitude aggregators F : (2X)N −→
2X 4 and Boolean homomorphisms f : 2N −→ 2.
Recall that there is a bijective correspondence between Boolean homomorphisms
f : 2N −→ 2 and ultrafilters of 2N . Moreover, if N is finite, every ultrafilter
of 2N is principal. In this case, a decision criterion corresponds to an ultrafilter
exactly when it is dictatorial.
5.2 An example of a natural interpretation for subjunctive
implication
In [4], Dietrich argues that, in order to reflect the meaning of connection rules (i.e.
formulas of the form p→ q or p↔ q such that p and q are conjunctions of atomic
propositions or negated atomic propositions) as they are understood and used
in natural language, the connective → should be interpreted subjunctively.That
is, the formula p→ q should not be understood as a statement about the actual
world, but about whether q holds in hypothetical world(s) where p holds, depends
on q’s truth value in possibly non-actual worlds. Dietrich proposes that, in the
context of connection rules, any such implication should satisfy the following
conditions:
(a) for any atomic propositions p and q, p → q is inconsistent with {p,¬q} but
consistent with each of {p, q} {¬p, q} {¬p,¬q};
(b) for any atomic propositions p and q, ¬(p → q) is consistent with each of
{p,¬q}, {p, q}, {¬p, q} and {¬p,¬q}.
Clearly, the classical interpretation of p → q as ¬p ∨ q satisfies only condition
(a) but not (b). The subjunctive interpretation of → has been formalised in
various settings based on possible-worlds semantics. One such setting, which
is different from the one adopted by Dietrich’s, is given by Boolean algebras
with operators (BAOs). These are Boolean algebras endowed with an additional
unary operation  satisfying the identities 1 = 1 and (x ∧ y) = x ∧ y.
Let us further restrict ourselves to the class of BAOs such that the inequality
x ≤ x is valid. This class coincides with AlgS, where S is the normal modal
logic T with the so-called local consequence relation. It is well known that T is
selfextensional and is complete w.r.t. the class of reflexive Kripke frames. In this
setting, let us stipulate that p→ q is interpreted as (¬p ∨ q).
It is easy to see that this interpretation satisfies both conditions (a) and (b). To
show that p→ q is inconsistent with {p,¬q}, observe that (¬p ∨ q)∧ p∧ ¬q ≤
(¬p ∨ q) ∧ p ∧ ¬q = (¬p ∧ (p ∧ ¬q)) ∨ (q ∧ (p ∧ ¬q)) = ⊥ ∨ ⊥ = ⊥.
To show that p→ q is consistent with {p, q},consider the two-element BAO s.t.
1 = 1 and 0 = 0. The assignment mapping p and q to 1 witnesses the required
consistency statement. The remaining part of the proof is similar and hence is
omitted.
4 Note that in this case an alternative presentation of F is F : P(X)N −→ P(X),
which is the standard one.
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Clearly, the characterization theorem given by Propositions 1 and 2 applies also
to this setting. However, the main interest of this setting is given by the possi-
bility theorems. It would be a worthwile future research direction to explore the
interplay and the scope of these results.
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